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ANALYSIS
ESTABLISHING FACTUAL AND LEGAL
CAUSATION IN A FIDUCIARY'S LIABILITY
To ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS
U
Rebecca Lee*
The fiduciary doctrine holds that a fiduciary must avoid a conflict of duty and personal
interest and must not derive any profit from his fiduciary position. Liability for
breach attracts the more extensive remedies of equity's armoury, including the gain-
stripping remedy of an account of profits. With respect to a fiduciary's liability to
account, although Hong Kong courts recognise that a causal connection between a
breach and its ensuing gain is required, there have so far been scant judicial remarks
on this front. This article argues that issues of causation and remoteness in the
award of an account of profits for a breach of fiduciary duty can be determined by a
two-stage inquiry. First, this article examines the possible approaches to establishing
factual causation and suggests that a probabilistic approach to causation may be a
better way forward. The answer to the second inquiry depends on the nature and
purposes of the equitable principles involved.
Introduction
The development of a concept of causation has always been more vibrant at
law rather than in equity. It has always been a constituent element of liability
to establish some causal relationships between a wrongdoing (such as breach
of contract or commission of a tort) and its consequence at common law. The
position was, until very recently, less clear in equity. The availability of more
extensive gain-stripping remedies in equity for a breach of fiduciary duty
further muddied the water. Not only does a defaulting fiduciary's liability
to account not depend on the beneficiary having suffered any loss, it also
appears that once an unauthorised profit is made following a breach of fidu-
ciary duty, causation is taken to have been proven.
Recently, there have been more active judicial excursions in Hong Kong
into whether, in a claim for an account of profits following a breach of fiduciary
duty, it is necessary to demonstrate that the fiduciary's breach was a cause of
the ensuing gain. This article first reviews these recent developments to see
* Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. I am grateful to Lusina Ho and Kelvin Low for their
helpful comments and suggestions. My gratitude also goes to the anonymous referee who suggested
the refinement and clarification of a few important points. All errors remain mine.
HeinOnline -- 36 Hong Kong L.J. 443 2006
how Hong Kong courts perceive the role of causation in a fiduciary's liability
to account. It is suggested that the issue of "causation" in the award of an
account of profits for breach of fiduciary duty can be determined by a two-
stage inquiry. The first pertains to the finding of whether the fiduciary's breach,
as a matter of fact, produced the gain. The possible causative tests that may
be adopted for this factual finding will be considered. It is argued that given
the nature and objective of fiduciary principles, in particular the function of
fiduciary loyalty to guard against risk of exposing the beneficiary to harm, a
probabilistic approach to establishing factual causation can be justified. The
second stage deals with what legal consequences the law should attach to the
fiduciary's breach. In other words, whether his breach was a legal or proxi-
mate cause. It is suggested that the answer depends on the proper scope of
liability of the relevant equitable principles.
Causation, Remoteness and Account of Profits for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
Causation and Fiduciary Loyalty
The classic exposition of the content of fiduciary loyalty is that a fiduciary
must avoid a conflict of duty and personal interest and must not derive any
profit from their fiduciary position.' These rules were rooted in the recogni-
tion of human fragility: fiduciaries, like every other ordinary person, may
succumb to the temptation of self-interest whenever circumstances are
expedient for them to do so. Because of the need to remove such temptation
in order to ensure fiduciary loyalty, a claim may be made to strip any gain
reaped by a defaulting fiduciary.
It has been suggested that the strictness of the fiduciary rules means that
causation is irrelevant in quantifying the extent of a fiduciary's liability to ac-
count: once an unauthorised profit is made following a breach of fiduciary duty,
causation is taken to have been proven. For example, in Murad v Al-Saraj,
the English Court of Appeal held that there was no causation dimension in
an account of profits for breach of fiduciary duty and the defaulting fiduciary
was strictly liable for all the unauthorised gains.' Commenting on the case,
Vann defends the decision on the ground that the existence of an unauthorised
1 See, for example, Bray v Ford [1986] AC 44 (HL); Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL); Chan v
Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 (HCA).
2 [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [2005] WTLR 1573 (CA).
3 Ibid., at para 67: ". . . it is no defence for a fiduciary to say that he would have made the profit even if
there had been no breach of fiduciary duty" (Arden L). See also Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd
v Koshy (No 3) [2004] 1 BCLC 131 (CA) at paras 145-147.
444 Rebecca Lee (2006) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 36 Hong Kong L.J. 444 2006
profit in the context of a fiduciary breach suggests that the fiduciary has been
disloyal, irrespective of whether part of the profit might have been authorised
by the beneficiary upon full disclosure. In order to achieve best approxima-
tion of loyal performance of the no-profit obligation, all unauthorised profit
must be disgorged.'
The view that causation is irrelevant also appears to have stemmed from
the development of equitable concepts. Equity has traditionally been more
adamant in providing full relief to plaintiffs. As a result, liability of the de-
faulting fiduciary is of a more absolute nature. This means that the element of
"causation" was formulated far less strictly or even regarded as irrelevant in
quantifying fiduciary gains. Arguably, all that is necessary to establish causa-
tion is a causal connection between the defaulting fiduciary's position and
their profit. For example, the trustee in Keech v Sandford' would not have
been in a position to renew the lease for himself had he not been trustee; and
the directors in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver' would not have been in a
position to subscribe for the shares had they not been directors.
Thus, profits made in consequence of such positions were held to be
sufficient for liability to arise. Properly understood, however, this only sug-
gests that the defaulting fiduciary was required to surrender his gain even
though it had not come at the beneficiary's expense.' Besides, cases like Keech
v Sandford and Regal (Hastings) did not expressly address the question of the
relevance or otherwise of causation and so should not be taken to have
denied a causal inquiry between the fiduciary's breach and their gain. In
quantifying fiduciary gains, there is still a causal inquiry between the fiduciary's
breach and his gain to be satisfied. This has been recognised by two recent
Hong Kong cases.
In Kao Lee & Yip v Koo Hoi Yan and Others,' the defendant solicitors set up
a new firm whilst still working for their existing employers and subsequently
diverted business to their new firm. Ma J held that the defendants breached
the fiduciary duties owed to their employers. But in order to disgorge the
unauthorised profits obtained from the diversion of a maturing business
4 Vicki Vann, "Causation and Breach of Fiduciary Duty" [2006] SingjLS 86 at 95, 98. Cf Rebecca Lee,
"Causation and Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty" [2006] SingJLS (forthcoming).
5 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61.
6 [1967] 2 AC 134 (HL) (hereafter referred to as Regal (Hastings)). See also John Glover, Equity, Resti-
tution and Fraud (Australia: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) at 202: "A nexus must exist between
profits made by fiduciaries and their fiduciary offices. Profits made 'by reason or by use of' fiduciary
offices involve the exploitation of that office that the rule requires".
7 See, for example, Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) at 280H where Lord Nicholls held
that trustees and fiduciaries must disgorge any unauthorised profit irrespective of any loss suffered by
the beneficiaries. See also Keech v Sandford, n 5 above, where the trustee was required to disgorge the
gains even though the beneficiary could not have obtained the lease himself.
8 [20031 3 HKLRD 296 (CFI) (hereafter referred to as Kao Lee & Yip).
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opportunity, there had to be a causal link between the opportunity and the
profits made. In deciding the extent of the account, it was necessary to focus
on causation and remoteness when examining the link between the breach
and the gain:
. .. [when ordering an account of profitsI the approach must be to take
into account various factors relevant to the critical inquiry (namely,
what is the gain that the fiduciary has made as a result of his breach of
fiduciary duty?)"'
". . . when dealing with an account of profits as regards business oppor-
tunities, the Court's approach must necessarily be flexible. The key is
to remember at all times the critical inquiry referred to above which
emphasises to need to focus on causation and remoteness when examin-
ing the link between the breach of duty and the gain."'o
More recently, a causal inquiry between the breach and the gain has also
been implicitly recognised by the Court of Final Appeal. In Tripole Trading
Ltd v Prosperfield Ventures Ltd, " the company directors breached their fiduciary
duty by attempting to enter into agreements to misappropriate certain shares
of their company's subsidiary. Although the impugned agreements were
not carried into effect, the defaulting directors were subsequently allocated
substantial shares after a restructuring exercise carried out by the Shenzhen
Government. In deciding whether causation provided a possible alternative
basis for liability of the directors, the Court rejected the decisions of the
lower courts that the agreements entered into in breach of fiduciary duty
provided the causal link with the Shenzhen Government's allocation of
shares. To them, there were other plausible reasons for the allocation of
shares, and the trial judge's conclusion that the defaulting directors' breach
enabled the Government to allocate shares to them was "wide of the mark".12
Despite the Court of Final Appeal's denial of the directors' liability, this
case indicates that all levels of courts in Hong Kong recognised the need
to find some causal relationships between the breach and the gain; proof
of such a causal link only failed on the facts before the Court of Final Appeal.
Indeed, the need to show some causal connections between the breach
and the gain has also been accepted by some other Commonwealth
' Ibid., at 339.
'o Ibid., at 340.
" [2006] HKEC 14, [2006] 1 HKLRD 200 (CFA) (hereafter referred to as Tripole).
12 Ibid., at para 66.
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jurisdictions." Besides, in other areas of law where an account of profits
is sought, there has been little dispute that proof of a causal connection is
essential. 14
This brief overview shows that courts have already shown a willingness to
endorse some causal connections between a breach and its ensuing gain. One
of the greatest objections to disgorgement of fiduciary gains is that, in one
sense, disgorgement may be said to result in a windfall for the beneficiary."
This concern is conventionally addressed by justifying the remedy on policy
grounds: it is essential to maintain a high standard of loyalty to ensure that
fiduciaries are financially disinterested in the discharge of their duties. 16 How-
ever, from a causal perspective, it is submitted that it is also plausible to address
this concern at a more pragmatic level by fine-tuning the remedy: there should
be limits to the order of an account of profits so that the defaulting fiduciary
is only accountable for those profits causally relevant to the breach. This
suggests application of principles of causation and remoteness. But before
attempting to grapple with the logical question that ensues, namely what tests
of causation and remoteness should be adopted in establishing fiduciary's
liability to account, a few comments on the proper causal inquiry are in order.
Causation: a two-stage inquiry
To start with, it is necessary to see how causation functions in delineating the
scope of relief for a breach of fiduciary duty. "Causation" is often used in a
loose sense. In fact, there are two stages to any causal inquiry." The first stage
identifies causes or, more precisely, "causally relevant conditions" by an
investigation and ascertainment of facts, and is regarded as establishing factual
causation. The law, however, does not treat all causally relevant conditions
as legally significant. Thus, there is a second stage pertaining to the scope of
legal responsibility that allows values and policies to be elucidated before
1 See, for example, Say-Dee Pty Ltd v Farah Constructions Pty Ltd [20051 NSWCA 309 where the New
South Wales Court of Appeal held that there was a causal link between the defendant's acquisition
of material information in the course of performing its fiduciary duties and the benefits derived from
his subsequent exploitation of the opportunity himself. The defendant was required to disgorge the
benefits derived from its breach. Note that the High Court of Australia heard the appeal of the case
in December 2006. See also Canada Inc v Strother (2005) 38 BCLR (4th) 159 (BCCA).
14 For example, in a claim for patent infringement, the court held in Celanese International Corp v BP
Chemicals Ltd [1999] RPC 203 (Patents Court) at para 37 that: "In an account the court is trying to
determine what profits have been caused, in a legal sense, by those acts".
15 This is particularly so when the commercial reality was that the beneficiary could not have reaped
the profit himself, as in Boardrnan v Phipps (n 1 above).
16 Attorney General v Blake (n 7 above) at 280G.
17 Antony Honor6, "Causation in the Law", in Edward N. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/
causation-law/ (visited 17 October 2006). Alternatively, Professor Weinrib suggested that there are
two meanings of the word "cause": Ernest J. Weinrib, "A Step Forward in Factual Causation" (1975)
38 MLR 518.
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legal responsibility is attributed. The causally relevant condition to which
legal responsibility is to be attributed is regarded as the legal or proximate
cause. Professors Hart and Honor6 believed that the two stages should not be
amalgamated.'" This dichotomy has also been judicially recognised.19
This two-stage process shows that a causal inquiry concerns the proper
allocation of legal responsibility for an outcome following certain conduct. In
determining an appropriate causative test, the policy reasons underlying a
particular area of law have to be taken into account. However, once an appro-
priate causative test is determined, the application of this test to ascertain
the existence of a causal relationship between the breach and the outcome
remains a question of fact.20 This article first deals with the determination of
an appropriate causative test in establishing factual causation (causal respon-
sibility) in an account of profits following a breach of fiduciary duty. There
follows a brief discussion of the answer to the second stage of the inquiry,
namely whether legal responsibility should be attributed to the causally rel-
evant condition(s) identified. As will be seen, this is influenced by factors
such as policy concerns of a particular legal rule.'
Establishing Factual Causation in a Fiduciary's Liability to Account
Current approaches to factual causation
There are two prominent approaches in the contemporary analyses of causal
responsibility which may be adapted to establishing causation in a fiduciary's
liability to account. Each will be examined in turn.
18 H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honor6, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn 1985), p Iii.
Note that the question of factual causation precedes legal causation: Glanville Williams, "Causation
in the Law" (1961) CL] 62 at 69.
19 See, for example, McHugh JA in Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 at 350:
". . . the common law is concerned with whether on a particular occasion a particular act or omission
contributed to the occurrence of a particular event (causation) and, if so, with whether responsibility
should attach to that act or omission (remoteness)." (emphasis in original). Cf BNZ v Guardian Trust
[1999] 1 NZLR 213 at 240 (Fisher J).
20 A legal system would decide whether causing harm is an element of legal responsibility, and once this
is decided, the question of whether the defendant's act was a cause of the harm would be a question of
fact, rather than a question of policy: see Hart and Honor6, n 18 above at 91-92. It should be noted
that although policy considerations should only come into play at the second stage of the inquiry, it
does not follow that the process of determining an appropriate causative test (as opposed to applying
the predetermined causative test) need also be value-free.
21 Some commentators - known as "causal minimalists" - consider the issue of remoteness to be
entirely an issue of legal policy. Note that Hart and Honord adopted a broader approach that while
the issue of remoteness is partly dictated by policy considerations, issues of factual causation may
also come into place. This is because when the court holds that the damage is remote, the ordinary
man would regard causation as not being established.
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1. "But for" causation
Under the "but for" test, A is a causally relevant condition of B if and only if
B would not have occurred in the absence of the occurrence of A. Applying
the "but for" test, in order to prove that the breach is a causally relevant
condition of the gain, the beneficiary must prove that the fiduciary would not
have made a gain for which disgorgement is claimed in the absence of the
fiduciary's breach. The "but for" test thus serves an exclusionary function in
that it enables us to eliminate irrelevant events. Although the "but for" test is
thought to be generally applied to common law claims (eg breach of contract
or commission of a tort22), it has also received judicial approval in equity. For
example, in the context of a claim for equitable compensation for a breach of
fiduciary duty, the English Court of Appeal in Swindle v Harrison" adopted
a "but for" test to hold that Mrs Harrison failed to show that the material
non-disclosure of her solicitor was a necessary constituent for her loss: such
necessity was precluded on the finding of facts.
Despite prevalence of the "but for" test, it has also been shown to be inad-
equate. First of all, causation asks what did happen. But instead of assessing
the defendant's conduct directly, the "but for" test asks whether the outcome
would or might have been the same had things been otherwise. This situation is
ex hypothesi non-existent,25 and thus answers for such counterfactual inquiries
are inevitably conjectural. Although in the run-of-the-mill cases, the two
questions (namely what happened and whether the outcome would or might
have been the same respectively) will produce the same answer, the "but for"
test fails to ascertain the causally relevant condition in cases of potential
multiple causes.26 A classic example can be found in the tort case of Summers
v Tice.27 The victim who was shot by two negligent hunters at the same time
could not prove which of them actually injured him under the "but for" test.
There is little doubt that both hunters were equally morally culpable, and
each should be described as a cause of the victim's injury, yet the "but for" test
22 In tort claims, for example, the "but for" test suggests that the tortfeasor's conduct is a cause of the
defendant's injuries if and only if, had the tortfeasor not acted tortiously, the defendant would not
have been injured. The tortfeasor's conduct need only be a cause of the defendant's injury.
23 [1997] 4 All ER 705 (CA).
24 It was found that Mrs Harrison would have taken up the loan to finance her hotel transaction anyway
even if there had been full disclosure by her solicitor that his firm was making a profit from the loan
transaction. Evans LJ quoted at 732f-g the trial judge's opinion that: ". . . It was, after all, a lifeline for
[Mrs Harrison]. There is no evidence that a better offer could have been obtained else-
where . .. Realistically, she had no choice". Rather, the loss flowed from her own decision to take
the risk involved in the hotel transaction: Mummery L at 735c.
25 Weinrib, n 17 above at 522.
26 This is known as the problem of over-determination.
27 33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P2d 1 (1948).
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fails to identify either of them as the wrongdoer. In a similar vein, a "but for"
causal link was also denied in the Court of Final Appeal case of Tripole: the
directors' breach of fiduciary duty (by attempting to misappropriate certain
shares under the impugned agreements) was not a necessary condition of
the gain because, in its absence, the Court suggested that they might still
have been allocated the shares by the Shenzhen Government due to other
plausible reasons."
2. Common sense approach to causation
Besides the "but for" test, another possibility would be to apply a common
sense approach to establishing factual causation in an account of profits for
a breach of fiduciary duty. This approach has been gaining favour recently,
albeit in claims for equitable compensation. This view was propounded by
McLachlin J in Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co." There, Canson
sought equitable compensation for their solicitor's breach of fiduciary duty by
failing to disclose to them material information relating to their property
transaction. It was found that Canson would not have proceeded with the
joint venture had they known the true facts. McLachlin J, in delivering a
separate concurring judgment, thought that applying a strict "but for" test
would clearly result in the solicitor being held liable even for losses caused
subsequently by the negligence of third party engineers and builders. Her
Ladyship therefore added a limitation to make those losses not recoverable
as follows:
". . . it is essential that the losses made good are only those which, on a
common sense view of causation, were caused by the breach.""
McLachlin J's minority judgment was subsequently endorsed by the House of
Lords in Target Holdings (Ltd) v Redferns.n2 However, despite it being couched
28 Or the "but for" test would fortuitously assign responsibility to the one whose shot was found to have
hit the victim, but not the other who missed him, even the moral wrongdoing of both was equival-
ent: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986),
Ch 12. Hart and Honor6 also noted the difficulty in such cases, but simply observed that "[it is
perfectly intelligible that in these circumstances a legal system should treat each as the cause rather
than neither, as the sine qua non test would require": Hart and Honord, n 18 above at 124. In view of
the inadequacies of the "but for" test, a NESS test has been introduced to deal with situations where
there are multiple sufficient causes. Under the NESS test, an act or omission is a cause if it is a
necessary element of a set of factors sufficient for the harm to occur: see Richard Wright, "Causation
in Tort Law" (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735.
29 Tripole (n 11 above). The brief facts of this case are set out in text accompanying nn 11-12 above.
Note that the Court of Final Appeal did not canvass the question of whether the impugned agree-
ments would have influenced the government allocation of shares.
30 (1991) 85 DLR (4th) 129 (SCC) (hereafter referred to as Canson Enterprises).
31 Ibid., at 163 (emphasis added).
32 [1996] AC 421 (HL) at 439 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (hereafter referred to as Target Holdings). The
case was referred to by the Court of First Instance in Man Fong Hang v Man Ping Nam & Others [2003]
HKEC 1475 (CFl).
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in terms of "causation" rather than "remoteness", it appears that this "com-
mon sense view of causation" acts only as a remoteness rule in attributing
legal responsibility, rather than being applied additionally as a causative test
in determining causal responsibility."
Nonetheless, the common sense test has seemingly assumed the additional
role of establishing factual causation: whenever the "but for" causative test
produces an unjust result, a more pragmatic common sense approach would
be preferred." Adopting a "common sense" causative test undeniably has the
merit of dispensing with the need to prove necessity of the alleged causally
relevant condition for the gain and thus in effect lowering the threshold for
establishing factual causation. Yet a few objections to the "common sense"
test can also be raised: First, since McLachlin J presupposed that rules of
remoteness are irrelevant," the common sense test may be deluged with the
function of attributing legal responsibility fairly. 6 As discussed above," there
are two stages of a causal inquiry, namely (first) identifying causally relevant
conditions and (second) attributing legal responsibility. The task of the caus-
ative test pertains to the first stage only. It is not necessary to introduce one
single test to confuse the different objects of the two stages of the inquiry.
Second, given Hong Kong courts have already accepted that remoteness is a
relevant consideration in quantifying the extent of an account of profits," it
is unnecessary to resort to a test which merges causation and remoteness. Last
but not least, the concept of "common sense" may itself be criticised for being
vague and unstable.
3 The remoteness rule is a causal limiting factor that severs the causal tie between the breach and the
gain. For example, Blackburne J opined in Nationwide Building Society v Balmer Radmore [1999] Lloyd's
Rep PN 241 at 282 that the loss following the breach of the fiduciary duty in Canson Enterprises was
"too remote for the breach to be said to be a loss flowing from it". Further, reading her Ladyship's
statement in context, McLachlin J was rejecting the common law principle of foreseeability as
a limiting factor in propounding a "common sense" rule for equity, though it was unclear whether
her Ladyship intended this "common sense" limiting factor to perform the function of a "but for"
causative test simultaneously.
3 As in Canson Enterprises (n 30 above). Further, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target Holdings (n 32
above) has been criticised for not differentiating between establishing factual causation and attribut-
ing legal responsibility: Richard Nolan, "A Targeted Degree of Liability" [1996] LMCLQ 161 at 163.
3 For example, McLachlin J stated in Canson Enterprises, n 30 above that ". . . foreseeability of loss does
not enter into the calculation of compensation for breach of fiduciary duty" (at 160) and
"[f]oreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensation" (at 163). Both statements were
endorsed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target Holdings, n 32 above at 438.
36 Alternatively, courts might have simply repackaged attribution of legal responsibility in terms of
causation rather than remoteness, as the English Court of Appeal did in Swindle v Harrison (n 23
above) when rejecting the relevance of remoteness yet emphasising the common sense causal link
between the breach and the loss: Lusina Ho, "Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Causal Responsibility"
(1997) 11 Trust Law International 72 at 75.
3 For an explanation of the two-stage causal inquiry, see text accompanying nn 17-21 above.
38 Otherwise, the single test may, for example, fail to undertake an open examination of all the relevant
policy considerations in attributing legal responsibility, a role which is assumed by the second stage of
the inquiry.
3 See, for example, Kao, Lee and Yip (n 8 above).
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In light of these objections, it is submitted that adoption and endorse-
ment of the common sense approach at best shows that courts appreciate the
inadequacies of the "but for" test and the need to adopt a less restrictive
causative test. If so, it is submitted that a different approach based on probab-
ilistic causation may be considered as an attempt to formalise the inherently
nebulous "common sense" approach.
Probabilistic Causation for Fiduciary's Liability to Account
Definition of probabilistic causation
The central idea is that causes raise the probability of their effects. If the
occurrence of A increases the probability of B more than if A does not exist,
then A raises the probability of B. Since B occurs at higher rates if A exists
than if it (A) does not, under a probabilistic causation approach, this is prima
facie evidence that A can be regarded as the cause of B.40
The probabilistic causation approach differs from the "but for" test in a
number of respects. First, the "but for" test requires proof of necessity of the
alleged breach. Expressing the "but for" test in terms of probability, the prob-
ability of B occurring without the occurrence of A is zero. The "but for" test is
therefore is akin to an all-or-nothing test." Under a probabilistic approach,
however, we are assessing the probability of various events, and whether the
probability of one event is increased because of some others. Thus, in the
context of a fiduciary's liability to account, so long as the alleged breach
of fiduciary duty is a significant factor contributing to the increase in the
probability of the occurrence of the ensuing gain, factual causation can
be established. This represents refinement (extension) of the "but for" test.
Second, contrary to the "but for" test which attempts to look backward by
making counterfactual inquiries," the probabilistic approach represents more
of an anticipatory determination of causally relevant conditions. One may
4 See further, Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds), Causation (Oxford: OUP, 1993) at 19-22 and the
references cited therein.
4 The causative test ("but for" or otherwise) relates to the quality of an alleged event required in prov-
ing causation between that event and the outcome. The "but for" test requires the event to be an
essential ingredient (hence akin to an all-or-nothing test) of the outcome; whereas the probabilistic
approach requires it to be a probabilistic element only. Whatever causative test is adopted, this is
different and separate from the question of civil burden of proof, which requires the elements con-
stituting the claim to be made out on a balance of probabilities.
42 For example, applying this test to Tripole (n 11 above), although the Court rejected the view that the
defaulting directors' breach of fiduciary duty was necessary for the government allocation of shares, if
the probability of government allocation of shares given the occurrence of the breach was greater
than the probability of allocation without the breach, this increased probability could amount to a
causally relevant condition of the gain under a probabilistic causation approach.
43 See text accompanying n 27 above.
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focus on the defaulting fiduciary's breach and then look forward to see if a
causal connection can be found between the breach and the gain."
Although a probabilistic approach to causation may seem novel, it has in
fact been endorsed by the English House of Lords. There is an emerging excep-
tion in the tort of negligence to deal with situations where it is extremely
difficult to establish a causal link between a defendant's wrongdoing and a
plaintiff's injury because of the existence of multiple defendants or the occur-
rence of multiple events leading to the injury. In such circumstances, the
standard "but for" test may be unworkable, but causation can still be estab-
lished on the basis that the defendant's negligence "materially contributed"
to the risk of occurrence of the injury. In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services
Ltd and Others," the workers contracted mesothelioma through the negli-
gence of the defendant employers who exposed them to asbestos dust. However,
it could not be known which of the negligent employers had caused the dis-
ease as the workers had worked during various periods of employment with
more than one of the employers. All that the workers could show was a sub-
stantial possibility that the asbestos had some connections with their disease.
The House of Lords held that in such circumstances (ie multiple causes, each
of which is independently capable of producing the injury), proof that each
defendant's wrongdoing had materially increased the risk of contracting the
disease was sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements for his liability."6 As a
result, each of the employers was held liable.
If this analysis is adopted, then a defendant held liable under the Fairchild
principle should only be severally liable to the extent that he has increased
the risk of the plaintiffs injury." This indeed was the decision of a subsequent
House of Lords case - Barker v Corus (UK) plc - which held that a defendant
was entitled to an apportionment of liability measured with reference to
his contribution to the risk of injury.48 If liability is to be established on
4 Admittedly, in law an assessment, based on the particular evidence, of the probability that an agent
caused the outcome in question is an ex post assessment.
45 [20021 UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 (HL) (hereafter referred to as Fairchild). See also McGhee v National
Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR I (HL).
46 Fairchild, ibid., at para 34 (Lord Bingham); para 47 (Lord Nicholls); paras 65-67 (Lord Hoffmann);
para 116 (Lord Hutton) and paras 168-170 (Lord Rodger). A departure from the standard "but for"
test is permissible only when certain conditions are satisfied: para 2 (Lord Bingham); para 61 (Lord
Hoffmann) and para 170 (Lord Rodger) and where justice so requires: para 9 and paras 32-33 (Lord
Bingham). Further, this is similar to the substantial factor test which has been adopted in the context
of negligence and a number of other torts by the US Restatement (Second) of Torts, para 432 (1965).
Contra the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Athey v Leonati (1996) 140 DLR (4th) 235
where a purely probabilistic approach was rejected.
4 See Sarah Green, "Winner Takes All" (2004) 120 LQR 566 at 570.
48 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 WLR 1027 at para 43 (Lord Hoffmann). See also the US Restatement
(Second) of Torts, para 433A (1965): "(1) Damages for harm for to be apportioned among two or
more causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm"
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probabilistic causation, one may query how significant a cause has to be in
order to qualify as a factual cause. The concern behind this query appears to
be the potential unfairness in assigning full causal responsibility to an event
where absolute proof is necessarily unattainable. While it may be unfair to
treat as certain a cause which has only a significant contribution to the result,
Barker v Corus (UK) plc opens the possibility of adjusting the award to reflect
the degree of probability contributed by an event."9
With the recent developments of causation in the law of tort, similar strides
in the equity jurisprudence may be expected. It is submitted that a prob-
abilistic causation approach to quantifying fiduciary gains would also be
consistent with the developments of the concept of causation in equity as
well as the objective of fiduciary law.
Developments of the concept of causation in equity
Although Hong Kong courts have recently recognised that a causal inquiry
between the breach and the gain is required,"o taking the historical develop-
ment of causation in a fiduciary's liability to account into consideration, it is
not difficult to discern that equity only requires a beneficiary to satisfy a
low causal threshold in order to hold a defaulting fiduciary accountable for
their gains." A probabilistic approach to causation sits comfortably with the
equity jurisprudence. While requiring proof of "but for" necessity in estab-
lishing factual causation would fall on one end of the causality spectrum and
dismissing any requirement of causality on the other, a probabilistic approach
represents a compromised solution between these ends. It establishes a causal
connection when there is an increase in probability of an outcome (gain) by
the occurrence of an event (breach). Its broader net of recovery arguably
aligns most closely with the conventional understanding that a low causal
threshold is all that is called for in quantifying fiduciary gains.
Objective of fiduciary law as alleviating risk of exposure to unauthorised
gains
Furthermore, it is submitted that a probabilistic approach to causation is con-
sistent with the objective of fiduciary law. A fiduciary relationship exists when
one voluntarily assumes a duty to act solely in the interests of another, and is
delegated discretion which can be exercised to (adversely) affect the position
49 Besides, the concern can also be addressed at the second stage of the causal inquiry. A remoteness
rule can be recognised and invoked where appropriate. See further, the section on "Establishing Legal
or Proximate Causation in Fiduciary's Liability to Account" below.
50 See text accompanying nn 8-12 above.
51 See text accompanying nn 5-6 above.
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of the latter.52 The position of the fiduciary may also be such that they have
exclusive access to information that is not generally available. The beneficiary's
interests may thus easily be prejudiced not only because the circumstances
make it expedient for the fiduciary to advance their own self-interest, but also
because scrutiny of the fiduciary's exercise of discretion is very costly, if not
impossible.
One of the objectives of fiduciary law is, then, to reduce the beneficiary's
risk of exposure to the harm" of their interests being prejudiced by deterring
the fiduciary from using their discretion save for the benefit of the beneficiary.
This can be achieved by means of imposing a fiduciary obligation of loyalty to
enhance the fiduciary's performance of their primary duty." That an objec-
tive of fiduciary law is to prevent risk of exposure to harm can be illustrated
by the following examples.
First, in a claim for breach of either of the no-conflict and no-profit fiduciary
rules, liability may arise even there was no actual "damage" or loss suffered by
the beneficiaries. This reinforces the objective of fiduciary law to protect the
beneficiary from risks of exposing to harm. The policy of deterrence would
hold that risks of unreasonable exposure to harm are sufficient to ground liab-
ility. For example, even though the company in Regal (Hastings) was unable
to take up a business opportunity, the defendant directors who later took it up
were held to be liable. Although the circumstances were arguably such that
no actual damage could have been suffered by the company in the first place,
Lord Russell nonetheless famously remarked that it was irrelevant whether
the profit "would or should otherwise have gone to the [company]".55
Second, a beneficiary may invalidate a transaction so long as they show
that the fiduciary might possibly have had the means of taking advantage of
the situation. For example, in Boardman v Phipps,"6 the beneficiary success-
fully claimed an account of profits from Boardman, solicitor to the trustees,
even though the trust could not have made use of the information and oppor-
tunity itself and Boardman who entered into the transaction could not have,
52 Hodgkinson v Simms (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) (La Forest J). See also Ernest J. Weinrib,
"The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 1 at 4.
53 See, for example, Tamar Frankel, "Fiduciary Law: The Judicial Process and the Duty of Care" in The
1993 Isaac Pitblado Lectures (University of Manitoba Law School), 143 at 144-145: "Because the
[fiduciary] relationship poses for one party ... substantial risks of misappropriation and monitoring
costs and because public policy strongly supports both groups of services, fiduciary law interferes to
reduce these risks and costs"; quoted in Hodgkinson v Simms, ibid., at 185 (La Forest J) (emphasis added).
54 Matthew Conaglen, "The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty" (2005) 119 LQR 452.
55 Regal (Hastings), n 6 above, at 144G. It should, however, be noted that this does not mean that
causation is irrelevant. As J. D. Heydon commented in "Causal relationship between a Fiduciary's
default and the Principal's loss" (1994) 110 LQR 328 at 332 that: ". . . it is one thing to strip a
fiduciary of profit without much enquiry; it is another to hold him accountable for all loss without
enquiring into relative causes".
56 See n 1 above.
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in the particular circumstances of the case, obtained the consent of all the
trustees. A theoretical (rather than real or sensible) possibility of conflict
encountered by Boardman - even it at most amounts to unreasonable expos-
ure of the beneficiary to risk - was held to be sufficient to ground liability.
If one of the objectives of fiduciary law were to deter risks, then liability
might well be imposed on the creation of unreasonable risks itself." Probabi-
listic causation identifies those events which may increase the risk of
prejudicing the beneficiary's interests as causally relevant conditions. It per-
forms precisely the role of regulating risks of exposure to harm. Since the
function of probabilistic causation coincides with the policy objective of
fiduciary law, this approach at least offers a viable alternative to the "but
for" test.
Establishing Legal or Proximate Causation in a Fiduciary's Liability to
Account
Once the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, it is necessary to
examine whether the fiduciary's breach is to be considered as a cause of the
gain for which legal responsibility is to be attributed. What legal consequences
should the law attach to the fiduciary's breach? At common law, this is tradi-
tionally addressed with reference to a rule of remoteness. In equity, although
there are suggestions that considerations of foreseeability or remoteness do
not operate to delimit the scope of liability (for equitable compensation) for
breach of fiduciary duty," the most prevalent formulation appears to have
invoked "common sense" notions 9 to answer this inquiry. It is submitted that
in order that the gain is not too "remote", the account must be within the
scope of liability for breach of fiduciary duty. But this must be read together
with the caveat that judges have expressed on the remedy:
57 Besides, that equity is concerned with risk aversion is not uncommon. For example, an injunction
may be granted against a former principal to prevent a real risk of disclosure of confidential informa-
tion of a former client: Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 (HL); Koch Shipping Inc v
Richards Butler [2002] EWCA Civ 1280, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 957 (CA).
58 Re Dawson [1966] NSWR 211 at 214-215; Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd
[1999] 1 NZLR 664 (NZCA) at 687 (Tipping J). Contra Steven Elliott, "Remoteness Criteria in
Equity" (2002) 65 MLR 588.
5 Canson Enterprises (n 30 above). Yet as discussed above, the concept itself is vague. A number of
suggestions have been made to refine this approach. See, for example, Lusina Ho, "Attributing losses
to a breach of fiduciary duty" (1998) 12 Trust Law International 66; Charles Rickett, "Equitable Com-
pensation: Towards a Blueprint" (2003) Syd LR 3.
60 Boardman v Phipps, n 2 above at 127 (Lord Upjohn); Warman International Ltd v Dywer [1994-1995]
182 CLR 544 (HCA) at 560.
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". -. the liability of the fiduciary should not be transformed into a vehicle
for the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.""'
Thus, in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer, although Dwyer exploited his
principal company's goodwill in setting up his own company, he was only
compelled to account for the profits of his business operation to his principal
for a limited period of two years to reflect his skill, expertise and other
expenses incurred. Likewise, the duty of loyalty requiring a trustee to act in
the sole interest of the beneficiary (thus prohibiting any profit to the trustee)
has been increasingly challenged."2 From a causal perspective, this simply
acknowledges a remoteness rule in quantifying fiduciary gains. For example,
while the decision in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer is conventionally
explained with reference to the court's exercise of remedial discretion, it could
also be understood in terms of part of the profit claimed being too remote or
beyond the scope of Dwyer's fiduciary duty" and hence legal responsibility
was restricted.
Test of remoteness
At common law, the reasonable foreseeability test is generally adopted. For
example, in the tort of negligence, the tortfeasor is liable for the type or kind
of damage that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the tort.64 In the law
of contract, the contract-breaker is liable for the type or kind of damage that
was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the
contract as likely to result from the breach.6' However, it is possible not to
adopt such metaphors in an account of profits, but consider openly the pol-
icies involved. Factors such as the nature of the gain or the degree of the
defaulting fiduciary's culpability could all be relevant. An example of the former
could be found in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer where a distinction was
drawn between those cases in which a specific asset was acquired by the
fiduciary and those in which a business was acquired and operated. 66 As to the
61 Warnan International Ltdv Dwyer, ibid., at 561. This has also been applied in a number of Hong Kong
cases. See, for example, Kao Lee and Yip, n 8 above at para 144; Wu Shun Kwan v Lam Koon Wan and
Another [20051 HKEC 635 at para 60. Cf claims for equitable compensation where the English Court
of Appeal held that liability should be decided by first identifying the scope of the duty breached and
the purpose of the rule imposing the duty: Swindle v Harrison, n 23 above at 734 (Mummery L).
62 See, for example, John Langbein, "Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?" (2005) 114 Yale Li 929 which argues that the duty of loyalty in trust law should be made
less strict.
63 This was the interpretation adopted by the majority in Murad v Al-Saral (n 2 above).
64 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Docks & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) (No 1) [19611
AC 388.
65 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341, 156 ER 145; Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron 11) [1969
1 AC 350.
66 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (n 60 above) at 561.
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latter, in Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) where the com-
pany director made an unauthorised profit by deliberately and dishonestly
failing to disclose his personal interests in transactions with the company,
Mummery L held that it was wrong to limit the scope of his account and that
he could not "be heard to say, as against the beneficiary company, that he was
entitled to retain any of the profits for himself". 7 This could be seen as draw-
ing a distinction between an honest and a dishonest breach of fiduciary duty,
and that in the circumstances, the egregious nature of the company director's
breach of fiduciary duty denied him of any benefit of a remoteness limita-
tion.68 Other factors such as whether the defaulting fiduciary should have
been aware of the future risks of his actions, or whether risk-taking entre-
preneurial activities should be allowed might also be relevant.
While it is impossible to offer any determinative test of remoteness, in
deciding how the rule of remoteness should operate, the above analysis at
least makes it possible to subject the liability of a defaulting fiduciary to
account to an open policy analysis. The use of mere discretionary languages
to conceal the proper role of a remoteness rule should be deprecated.
Conclusion
Causation is of central importance in our understanding of any area of law,
but is a topic bewildered with intractable complexity. This article shows
how a fiduciary's liability to account for profits in a breach of fiduciary duty
can be determined with reference to a two-stage causal inquiry. In establish-
ing factual causation, the "but for" test is not sacrosanct. Although a
probabilistic approach appears novel if not radical, it has been endorsed in
some negligence cases in tort. As fiduciary law regulates exposures to risk,
adopting a causative test which requires a lower threshold for establishing
factual causation is not objectionable. Further, by casting a wider net of
recovery over the potentially causally relevant conditions, a probabilistic
approach to causation can be justified on the basis that it aligns most closely
with the strict prophylactic approach to a fiduciary's liability to account. Thus,
there is much scope for further exploration of the possibility of embracing
this approach in equity.
67 See n 3 above at para 137.
68 The egregious nature of the company director's breach of fiduciary duty was emphasised throughout
the judgment. Cf the tort of deceit where the tortfeasor's liability extends to all loss directly flowing
from the breach, whether it was reasonably foreseeable or not: Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank
NA [1997] AC 254 (HL).
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Nevertheless, establishing factual causation in a fiduciary's liability to
account is only the first stage of a causal inquiry. A causal inquiry involves
two analytically distinct stages. Any concern regarding potential windfall of
the beneficiary resulting from disgorgement of fiduciary gains can further be
properly alleviated at the (second) stage of attributing legal responsibility.
Here, the question of legal causation is at least to some degree an issue of legal
policy, such as whether equity should in the particular case extend or restrict
liability independently of causal (factual) connection. So far, only disparate
factors, including emphasising the court's remedial discretion; fashioning an
appropriate equitable allowance or imposing a cap on the duration on the
order etc, have been suggested to qualify absolute disgorgement. It is submit-
ted that in articulating relevant principles for a fiduciary's liability to account,
a remoteness rule which delimits the boundaries of the award within the scope
of liability for breach of fiduciary duty would be helpful.
In conclusion, although it would be difficult to achieve any mathematical
exactness in attributing causal and legal responsibility, analytical tools
such as causative tests and rules of remoteness are vital if the law is to be
progressed on a rational basis.
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